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At the 2009 Copenhagen Climate Summit, it was decided that by 2020, 
donors should rally up not less than US$100 billion per year for climate 
change adaptation and mitigation in developing countries. How much each 
donor should contribute to that annual target remains an open question, 
however. Dividing that ‘burden’ in equal parts would be rather unfair. Some 
countries are bigger and/or richer, but more importantly,some carry more 
responsibility for climate change than others in terms of their share in 
greenhouse gas emissions. 
So, although the Climate Summit in 2009 did not establish a clear scheme of 
burden-sharing, the 1992 UNFCCC (United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change) provides one general principle as a starting point: Common 
but Differentiated Responsibilities and Respective Capabilities (CBDR&RC). Put 
simply, this means that countries that have higher CO2 emissions (and 
thus pollute more than other countries)  should take up larger financial 
commitments, as should richer countries. But have they done so? Who has 
provided how much climate finance to date? 
What has become of all these nice promises?
To start with, reaching the US$ 100 billion per year by 2020 appears to be 
off-track. Given the lack of agreed definitions and baselines, estimates 
of how much climate finance is being mobilised differ widely and figures 
are contested. Regardless of how generously climate finance is measured, 
however, studies and reports agree that climate finance will be insufficient 
to meet the demand.
Interestingly, bilateral donors differ strongly in how much bilateral climate 
funding they provide, as  the figure below shows.
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In absolute volumes, the largest climate donors by far are Japan, Germany 
and France, with an average of $5.6, $3.6 and $2.9 billion in the years from 
2011 to 2015 respectively. Together, they are responsible for about 70% of 
all bilateral climate aid. However, absolute volumes can also be somewhat 
misleading: larger countries tend to have larger budgets and thus more 
money available for climate funding. It is therefore important to take the size 
of the population into account. 
When we do this, a very different picture emerges. Norway is the biggest 
climate donor on a per capita basis, spending no less than $165 per capita and 
per year (on average over the time frame of the study). Norway is followed by 
Germany, Japan (both around $44) and France ($43). Other Nordic countries 
also provide quite high levels of climate aid per capita annually: Denmark $42 
and Sweden $40. In contrast, other countries, including some Central and 
Southern European countries, allocate very little to climate projects, both in 
absolute terms and per capita.
So the above clearly shows that bilateral donors differ in how much aid they 
spend on climate related projects and programmes. The question is why? Can 
the differences be explained by the principle of Common but Differentiated 
Responsibilities and Respective Capabilities? 
Our research looked into this question and the results are worrisome.
3The polluter pays? Currently, they’re not!
In the period 2010-2015, the statistical exercise clearly shows that bigger 
polluters do not contribute more to the US$ 100 billion target. Quite to 
the contrary. Those countries most responsible for increased atmospheric 
concentrations of greenhouse gases (like the USA) provide the lowest levels 
of climate aid, with the largest emitters predicted to give close to nothing (on 
a per capita basis). By contrast the countries that have in total contributed 
the least to global CO2 emissions provide the highest levels of climate aid per 
capita, at approximately $12 per capita and year. 
On a positive note, our findings do suggest that richer countries – all else 
being equal – do spend more on climate funding than poorer countries. 
The richest countries in our panel spend well over $20 per capita on climate 
projects, compared to less than $3 per capita for the poorest countries.
Do green parties make a difference?
What about other explanations for variation in the level of climate aid 
provided? Ideology could of course play a role. From other research (paywall), 
we know that left-wing and right-wing governments differ in how generously 
they support aid projects. That Nordic countries are quite generous climate 
aid funders may be due to ideology. Yet, our results on ideology and countries’ 
“greenness” are rather striking and worrisome. 
While we expected that the presence of green parties would positively affect 
the levels of climate funding, the statistics show no relation whatsoever 
between spending and green parties in power, and/or number of green 
members of parliament. This robust finding – tested with different variables 
– calls for more research because it is completely counterintuitive and 
worrisome. One possible explanation is the problem of under- and over-
reporting of climate aid. Other research has found considerable levels of 
over-reporting and mislabeling of funds, and some find that governments’ 
decision to mark or report a given aid flow as climate aid or not might depend 
on a political/ideological interpretation. 
What to do?
First of all, the fact that polluters are not paying implies that the 
internationally agreed upon principle of Common but Differentiated 
Responsibilities is a hollow token. This finding indicates the need to think 
about and establish accompanying measures at the international level to 
realise this principle. The UNFCCC has an important role to play here since 
the UNFCCC negotiations are the platform on which these agreements and 
principles are established. We strongly argue that the UNFCCC should not 
settle for principled agreements alone but they should also think about and 
negotiate accompanying measures which address unfair burden sharing 
arrangements. Civil society has a role to play here too. Naming, shaming 
and blaming the polluters who are not taking up their responsibility is one 
soft power tool that can be deployed. Researchers providing evidence can 
support endeavours to push for the realization of the principle of “common 
but differentiated responsibilities”.
Second, data quality and reliability is an issue that needs to be addressed 
by the climate negotiations. At the moment, both UNFCCC and OECD/
4DAC data rely entirely on donors’ own classification of their aid as climate 
relevant or not. As several studies have shown, donors tend to overestimate 
the climate relevance of their development assistance, mislabel funds and 
double- or even triple-count funds against several objectives. Accordingly, 
it is difficult to track climate finance and to monitor and verify reported 
flows, yet such monitoring and verification is necessary to hold donors to 
account to their promise of “mobilising” USD 100 billion per year by 2020. 
The UNFCCC as well as the OECD/DAC, on which most donors rely for their 
reporting of climate finance, need to develop clear definitions and guidelines 
to improve transparency and regain trust in the negotiations. Civil society 
and researchers on the other hand can also play a watchdog role here in 
unveiling different reporting practices.
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Recommendations
For UNFCCC and OECD/DAC
Consider and establish accompanying measures to realise the principle of 
Common but Differentiated Responsibilities
Develop clear definitions and guidelines to facilitate tracking, monitoring 
and verification of climate finance
For civil society and researchers
Naming, shaming and blaming of polluters who do not fulfil their 
responsibilities
Watchdog role: unveiling different reporting practices
